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Summary
This article provides a panorama of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission inequalities between French
households. It presents in a detailed and critical manner the methodological conventions that are
used to compute “household emissions”, including the related assumptions. The most common
responsibility principle, the “consumer responsibility”, assigns to households the emissions of the
products that they consume, resulting in the carbon footprint. It focuses attention on the
contributions of individuals, on their choices, and it may obscure the role of non-individual actors
and also the collective component of GHG emissions, and it neglects the dimensions of
responsibility that are not related to consumption choices.
We estimate the distribution of household carbon footprints based on data from the 2011 French
Household Budget Survey. Household emissions tend to increase with income, but they also show
a strong variability linked to geographical and technical factors that force the consumer to use
fossil fuels.
Based on sectoral surveys (ENTD 2008; PHEBUS 2013), we also reconstruct household CO2
emissions linked to housing and transport energy. For transport, emissions are proportional to the
distance travelled due to the predominant use of private cars. Urban settlement patterns constrain
both the length of daily commuting and access to less carbon-intensive modes of transport. For
housing, while the size of the dwelling increases with income and distance from urban centres, the
first factor to account for variability of emissions is the heating system: this has little to do with
income but more to do with settlement patterns, which constrain access to the various energy
carriers.
Finally, we discuss the difficulties, both technical and conceptual, that are involved in estimating
emissions from the super-rich (the top 1 percent).
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Abstract
This article provides a panorama of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission
inequalities between French households. It presents in a detailed and
critical manner the methodological conventions that are used to compute “household emissions”, including the related assumptions. The
most common responsibility principle, the “consumer responsibility”,
assigns to households the emissions of the products that they consume, resulting in the carbon footprint. It focuses attention on the
contributions of individuals, on their choices, and it may obscure the
role of non-individual actors and also the collective component of GHG
emissions, and it neglects the dimensions of responsibility that are not
related to consumption choices.
We estimate the distribution of household carbon footprints based
on data from the 2011 French Household Budget Survey. Household
emissions tend to increase with income, but they also show a strong
variability linked to geographical and technical factors that force the
consumer to use fossil fuels.
Based on sectoral surveys (ENTD 2008; PHEBUS 2013), we also
reconstruct household CO2 emissions linked to housing and transport
∗
This is a revised and extended translation of an article that was originally published
in French by Antonin Pottier, Emmanuel Combet, Jean-Michel Cayla, Simona de Lauretis and Franck Nadaud (2020), “Qui émet du CO2 ? panorama critique des inégalités
écologiques en France”, Revue de l’OFCE, 169, p. 73–132.
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energy. For transport, emissions are proportional to the distance travelled due to the predominant use of private cars. Urban settlement
patterns constrain both the length of daily commuting and access to
less carbon-intensive modes of transport. For housing, while the size
of the dwelling increases with income and distance from urban centres,
the first factor to account for variability of emissions is the heating system: this has little to do with income but more to do with settlement
patterns, which constrain access to the various energy carriers.
Finally, we discuss the difficulties, both technical and conceptual,
that are involved in estimating emissions from the super-rich (the top
1 percent).
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Keywords: greenhouse gas emissions, carbon footprint, emissions inequality, household expenditure distribution, responsibility
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Who is the CO2 emitter?
Landscape of ecological inequalities in France from
a critical perspective
Antonin Pottier, Emmanuel Combet, Jean-Michel Cayla, Simona de
Lauretis et Franck Nadaud
In the fall of 2018, the French “Yellow vest” movement highlighted the
demand for social justice in the conduct of the ecological transition. For
example, it was considered unfair that a wealthy household was not taxed
when they flew to the other side of the world to spend their holidays, while a
poor household suffered an increase in diesel taxes without the opportunity
to change their vehicle. Social justice, understood in this way, would consist
of a balance between the environmental damage caused by a person and the
effort required of them by the public authorities. In contrast, injustice would
come from the fact that “the rich are destroying the planet”(Kempf, 2007)
while they reduce their emissions little, where the poor pollute little but
contribute much to the mitigation effort. To appreciate the social justice of
the ecological transition, it seems necessary to first understand the inequalities that we will call “ecological inequalities” 1 ; in this case, inequalities in
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
This article provides a detailed overview of CO2 emissions inequalities
in France2 , based on original work to reconstruct household GHG emissions.
This panorama is never neutral because the simple description of emissions
is neither obvious nor unambiguous, even though there are standard ways
of proceeding. Indeed, household emissions cannot be measured in the same
way as one measures the size of a person: estimating emissions requires accounting conventions that are derived from a point of view that is partly
arbitrary. We have therefore decided to detail, discuss and critically review
the methodological conventions that are used to calculate “household emissions”. In doing so, we wish to set out as clearly as possible the assumptions
of this type of study, which is rarely done. We want to highlight the limits
1
Following up on Emelianoff (2008), which proposed to distinguish between ecological
inequalities (i.e. the inequalities of impact generated, such as how much each person
contributes to air pollution) and environmental inequalities (i.e. the inequalities of impact
suffered, such as how much each person is exposed to air pollution).
2
Among studies of carbon footprints of households, Lenzen (1998), Wier et al. (2001),
Roca and Serrano (2007), Weber and Matthews (2008), Golley and Meng (2012), Gough
et al. (2012), Büchs and Schnepf (2013), Ummel (2014), Steen-Olsen et al. (2016), Isaksen
and Narbel (2017), Wiedenhofer et al. (2017) and Gill and Moeller (2018) deal more
specifically with emissions inequalities and their link with income inequalities. For France,
see Lenglart et al. (2010); Malliet (2020).
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of the resulting analysis and thus warn about the necessary precautions to
be taken in interpreting ecological inequalities.
Three pitfalls are important to point out here. First, to establish how
much a household, a company or a state “emits” CO2 , we must choose accounting rules; that is, ways to allocate to an agent the emissions generated
by an activity that always involves several agents. The final result will be expressed as “this household emits 10 tCO2e ”. This figure of 10 tCO2e emissions
must always be interpreted in the light of the chosen accounting principles
because what is meant by “emit” in this context is precisely defined by these
principles3 . An additional difficulty is that the expression is often understood
as this household “causes” or “is responsible for” 10 tCO2e , a shift in meaning
that is often imperceptible and unavoidable. However, statistical ways of
imputation often contradict moral conceptions of causality or responsibility.
We are not advocating here for a specific conception of responsibility but we
are highlighting this unbreakable link between accounting and conception of
responsibility, including the tensions generated by this link.
Second, finding out how much greenhouse gas each emits is a choice
of the analyst, who ignores the other, non-individual, entities involved in
GHG emissions. This directs the research towards individual behavior rather
than social organisation, corporate strategies or government policies. Consequently, thinking in terms of individual or household emissions focuses
attention on the individual’s contributions and their choices, while concealing the presence of non-individual actors and the collective component of
GHG emissions, and the need to act together to reduce them. This apprehension of ecological inequalities reinforces the individualistic and moralising
prism through which climate policies are viewed (Comby, 2015).
Finally, linking ecological inequalities and income inequalities is another
strong trend, which risks making income the main, if not the only, factor
explaining ecological impacts. If, like others, we confirm that having a higher
income leads on average to “emitting” more CO2 , then we should insist on
the fact that income alone does not account for ecological inequalities. At
a given income, there is a high variability of emissions. Other dimensions,
known as “horizontal” inequalities (as opposed to the “vertical” dimension of
the income scale), come into play, such as the urban settlement patterns or
the heating systems 4 . They should not be forgotten when we talk about
ecological inequalities and social justice.
In this article, we will first outline the methodological difficulties to be
3

The polysemy of the term “emit” is therefore very large. It is not uncommon for a
text, whether militant or scientific, to surreptitiously move from one meaning to the other.
4
The issues of equity according to average vertical inequalities have been highlighted
since the 1990s (Pearce, 1991; Poterba, 1991); the importance of horizontal inequalities
for energy and carbon was more recently highlighted (Combet et al., 2010; Dubois, 2012;
Büchs and Schnepf, 2013; Douenne, 2018; Berry, 2019; Cronin et al., 2019; Stiglitz, 2019;
Clément et al., 2019).

4

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1333

6

Pottier et al.: Who emits CO2? Landscape of ecological inequalities in Franc

overcome and the principles to be chosen to evaluate the emissions of a household, indicating the data required in the different operations and focusing on
consumption-based accounting, which is the most frequently used approach.
We insist on the framing effect operated by this approach and the conception
of the responsibility that it conveys. We then present our overview of emission inequalities in France. First, we deal with the carbon footprint (i.e. the
direct and indirect GHG emissions linked to household consumption). We
then focus on CO2 emissions related to energy consumption in housing and
private transport, for which the more detailed data that are available allow
us to better discern the economic, social or technical factors of dependence
on fossil fuels and inequalities between households. The carbon footprint of
the very wealthy is then used as a case study to examine some problems of
both estimation and attribution of CO2 emissions. Finally, after having discussed the case of emissions from the wealthy, “the 1%”, we conclude these
analyses by identifying the conditions of equity of an ecological transition
and designing appropriate public policies.

1

The problem of allocating emissions

A coal-fired power plant releases CO2 to the atmosphere by burning coal
to produce electricity. Who is responsible for these CO2 emissions? The
country in which the plant is located? The government that authorised its
construction? The operating company that manages the plant on a day-today basis? the shareholders who have invested their capital? The country
where the coal comes from? The mining company that mined the coal? The
users of the electricity produced? The manufacturer of the (energy-guzzling)
appliance that is powered by the electricity? There is no right answer here,
all of them are equally possible because the emissions from the power plant
are not the work of a single, well-defined actor, they are at the crossroads
of several agencies, they are all entities with an intention and a capacity to
act. Allocating emissions necessarily means selecting the relevant entities
and determining the generating actions. This is an arbitrary operation,
which proceeds from a certain point of view on who is “causing” and who is
“responsible” for the emissions from the coal-fired power plant. This point
of view guides the establishment of the accounting principles that allocate
the emissions to the relevant entities chosen according to the generating
activities that are being considered. These rules also have their internal
logic and specific constraints, which make it necessary sometimes to specify
and modify the initial point of view.

1.1

Production-based and consumption-based accounting

The problem of attributing GHG emissions first arose for countries. Let us
look at the most common accounting principles, disregarding variations in
5
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detail.
National inventories conducted under the UNFCCC are the basic statistical source. These inventories classify GHG emissions according to the nature
of the gas and the country where the emission took place. Emissions are allocated to the country if they took place on its territory. In our example,
emissions would be allocated to the country in which the coal-fired power
plant is located. Therefore, these inventories group the emissions according
to the country of production, which is called production-based accounting
(or territory-based accounting, with slight differences between the two).
While the production-based accounting is adopted by international law,
consistent with the idea that States are responsible for the territories under their jurisdictions (Liu, 2015), researchers have developed other ways of
allocating emissions. The most common is consumption-based accounting,
also known as carbon footprinting (Peters, 2008). In this case, emissions are
allocated to the location of the final consumers of the goods or services that
have the GHG-generating activity. In our example, emissions are attributed
to the country in which the product whose manufacturing used the electricity
from the coal-fired plant was consumed. Things can become very complicated here because the product in question may not be a product intended
for final consumption but may instead be an intermediate product that will
be transformed: the electricity generated by coal in country A is used to
produce aluminium, which is then transformed in country B into a can of
soda to be consumed in country C, which will ultimately be attributed with
the emissions from the power plant.
Calculating a country’s emissions in the consumption approach is therefore based mainly on the environmental accounts (NAMEA) (which list how
much each industry in each country emits GHGs directly) and on the inputoutput tables for international trade (which describe, in particular, in an
aggregated manner by economic sectors, the sales of companies to other
companies, whether these are located on the national territory or abroad, as
well as to end users). Input-output analysis methods (Leontieff’s inversion
in particular) make it possible to reconstruct, using technical assumptions,
the emissions generated throughout the production chain of a product. The
carbon footprints of the countries thus obtained (Davis et al., 2010; Barrett
et al., 2013) include not only direct emissions, both foreign and domestic,
for the manufacture of products consumed in the country but also emissions
for the manufacture of inputs, inputs of inputs, and so on, which are based
on statistical and computational apparatus and not on direct observations.
Their preciseness is necessarily limited by the quality of the statistical sources
used (Tukker, Wood, and Schmidt, 2020), while their accuracy is limited by
the quality of the assumptions made (Lenzen, 2000, p. 136-142).
These two approaches are the most common, but they are not the only

6
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ones5 . Other methods exist, such as extraction-based accounting, which is
used to identify countries or companies that are sources of fossil energy whose
combustion releases carbon into the atmosphere (Davis et al., 2011; Heede,
2014); income-based accounting, which allocates emissions allowed by the
supply of factors of production (capital and labour) (Marques et al., 2012);
or issue-based accounting, which focuses on emissions related to a technique
designed and produced by an industrial process (Rose, 2013). There are also
different ways of counting emissions from organisations and companies that
are geared towards action or reporting, with different scopes and accounting
principles (Le Breton, 2017).

1.2

Individualising allocation

Calculating a country’s emissions is not a straightforward task, while moving
from country to individual adds an extra level of complexity. Emissions
per capita are often considered. They are obtained simply by dividing a
country’s emissions, whether consumption-based or production-based, by its
total population. These per capita emissions correspond to those of the
“average” resident in the statistical sense of the term (Desrosières, 1993,
chap. 3): they are not those of a real person, they are just another way of
presenting the emissions of countries regardless of the size of their population.
While this is a useful way of comparing countries, it does not allow for
comparisons of the emissions of different socio-demographic groups or socioprofessional categories. For example, we would like to know the emissions
of a pensioner living in a rural area, or those of a couple with five years of
higher education without children living in a large metropolitan area. To do
this, we must first specify the accounting principle for allocating emissions
to individuals.
How do we define an individual’s emissions? Consumption-based accounting is the most common, if not the only, approach: the emissions of
an individual are the emissions generated by all the stages of production
of the final products that they consume. This includes not only the direct
emissions released by the individual (e.g. by burning petrol in a car) but
also the indirect (or upstream, or embodied) emissions that were necessary
to produce the products and services that they consumed (e.g. to extract the
oil and refine it into petrol; to heat the greenhouse that grows the tomatoes
that they purchase, and to transport and package them). This approach
makes it possible to attribute to households all of the emissions related to
their final consumption.
How can this approach be implemented? Apart from a derived method
5

Tukker, Pollitt, and Henkemans (2020) present five accounting principles (productionbased, consumption-based, extraction-based, income-based, value-added based) with corresponding methodologies.
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that will be discussed in section 4, two main methods can be used: based on
either physical or monetary consumption data.
The first method deducts emissions from the physical quantities (kilogram of beef, gallon of petrol, m3 of gas etc.) that are actually consumed
by a person. The difficulties of this method concern both the conversion
from quantities to emissions and the knowledge of quantities. If the conversion of a gallon of gasoline to emissions is based on a specific emission
factor determined by combustion chemistry, then the emissions generated by
the manufacture of a product are more complicated to estimate. They are
known, for example, from the upstream part of a life cycle assessment (LCA)
of the product. An LCA requires a lot of data on industrial processes, energy
consumption, raw materials, and suppliers. In addition, this assessment is
not systematic. Thus, the emissions contained in a given purchased product
are often unknown, nor are the quantities consumed, or imperfectly, due to
the lack of institutional or private systems to record them. While it is easy to
reconstruct from the electricity bill the kilowatt-hours consumed, who can
tell how many kilos of meat one ate and how many gallons of petrol one
burned? Consequently, we often limit ourselves to the emissions that can
reasonably be reconstructed from the available data. For example, with the
kilometres travelled during the year (recorded by the meter) and the type of
vehicle, we can deduce with a good approximation the CO2 emitted by the
use of the vehicle, where a more precise estimate would be obtained from
gallons of gasoline. This method, or simplified variants of it, is used in the
individual’s carbon footprint that is proposed by many websites (Schlumpf
et al., 1999), and in some surveys of people’s behaviour (GreenInside, 2011;
Sessego and Hébel, 2018).
The second method uses the amount spent to purchase each consumption item to estimate total emissions. This relies on a Household Budget
Survey, which gives the annual expenditure budget, segmented into different consumption items, for each household in a representative sample. This
is then combined with the emission content for each item, as reconstructed
by the input-output analysis6 . Given that this method is a refinement for
individuals of the consumption-based accounting for countries, it inherits
the uncertainties that have already been mentioned. It also adds specific
uncertainties because the estimate is carried out on particular microentities
(households) and not at the scale of large macroeconomic aggregates. While
considering an average emission content for an industry can be justified as
representing the emission content of the average output of the industry, this
averaging is no longer relevant when considering specific expenditures: a
particular individual buys a specific product of one company and not the
average output of an industry.
Ultimately, these two methods allow individual consumption-based emis6

Steen-Olsen et al. (2016) precisely describe the methods, its difficulties and its limits.
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sions (or carbon footprint) to be calculated using a combination of activity
data (quantities consumed, sums spent) and emissions factors (tCO2e / litre
of petrol...) or emissions content (tCO2e / euro spent). In addition to the
difficulty of collecting accurate activity data, the use of average emission
contents is responsible for uncertainties in the final result: one euro has the
same carbon content, whether spent on low-end or luxury clothing. In other
words, the “quality effect” (as we shall call it) is not taken into account.
These uncertainties can be more easily controlled for the method that relies on physical quantities because the emission factors are less uncertain.
We will use the monetary method to estimate households’ carbon footprints
(2) and the physical method to calculate emissions from energy services in
housing and private transport (3).

1.3

Assumptions behind the carbon footprint

Counting an individual’s consumption-based emissions is today the most
widespread allocating principle when dealing with ecological inequalities.
Consequently, the presuppositions of this principle are rarely recalled, discussed or questioned, even though they are sometimes in tension with the
rest of the discourse within which the carbon footprint is mobilised. However, they should be kept in mind to be aware of the framing created by
invoking carbon footprints.
The principle of allocating emissions to final consumption is often justified by making consumption the ultimate cause of emissions7 . This principle
seems natural because it is congruent with other representations of the economy: that of national accounts for which consumption is an end; that of
economics textbooks in which consumer satisfaction is the driving force of
the economic system (and not, for example, the accumulation of capital); and
that of neo-liberalism, which insists on individual choices to the detriment of
the role of collective structures. It also resonates with the conception of conscious consumption, in a representation that depicts active consumers who
can orient production conditions through their purchases (Jacobsen and Dulsrud, 2007). This is in line with the problematisation initiated in the 1990s,
which makes the consumer-citizen responsible for environmental pressures
(Rumpala, 2009). All of these representations are embodied in personalised
emissions measurement devices, which aim to inform an individual’s decisions
and modify their practices (Paterson and Stripple, 2010). Through this set
of correspondences, the vision of an economic system driven by consumer
preferences unfolds, which makes it legitimate to reduce the consequences of
7
Druckman and Jackson (2009, p. 2066) say it explicitly and honestly: “The premise of
this study is that the responsibility for carbon dioxide emissions from economic activity lies
with people’s attempts to satisfy certain functional needs and desires.” The justification
is most often implicit, usually through the use of the word “ultimately; see for example
Ummel (2014, p. 1) or Isaksen and Narbel (2017, p. 153).
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economic activity, and in particular GHG emissions, to this final cause.
The disadvantage of this framing is that it leaves many actors, both economic and political, who are involved in GHG emissions in the shadows.
Emissions are the product of a socio-economic system of actors interacting
at multiple levels. Consumers are only one category among many others,
alongside companies that choose production techniques or governments that
lay down the rules organising the economic space. The final consumer’s
agency is no more ultimate than that of the companies that not only respond to demand but also channel it, supervise it and even create it. In an
interdependent system, singling out an actor is a matter of convention.
This convention is perfectly acceptable (as well as another one) as long as
we stick to statistical attribution of emissions. The danger lies in the moral
sense given to this attribution, which is perfectly expressed in a phrase like
“we are each responsible for our emissions and for those that were necessary
to produce the goods we decide to consume” (Gollier, 2019). Even if the
calculation of carbon footprints is not done from this moral perspective,
the shift from statistical to causal and then moral ascription is frequent,
imperceptible and, in fact, inevitable. Rather than erecting a separation
between attribution and responsibility, which the circulation of notions in
the public space would soon have annihilated, it is better to recognise that
the carbon footprint conveys a specific conception of responsibility, which
the English-language literature sometimes explicitly qualifies as “consumer
responsibility” (Munksgaard and Pedersen, 2001; Bastianoni et al., 2004;
Marques et al., 2012).
Consumer responsibility, which is the moral counterpart of consumptionbased accounting, is as singular a responsibility principle as it is questionable.
Indeed, in moral philosophy, two conditions are often required to speak of
responsibility: information and control (Oshana, 2015). If we can accept
that the consumer is responsible for the act of purchasing, then is it really
obvious that they are responsible for the emissions generated upstream of
this act? The consumer is not, except in exceptional cases, informed of
the CO2 emissions contained in the product purchased, nor do they control
those emissions—much less, in any case, than the company that runs the
production lines and supply chains.
These remarks do not absolve consumers of their responsibility, nor do
they suggest that consumption and lifestyle changes are unnecessary. They
are simply a reminder that responsibilities are shared among all the players
involved in GHG emissions. The whole question is whether and how one can
estimate the share of everyone and everything, individuals or legal entities,
collective structure or social groups. However, as a measure of responsibility, individual carbon footprints should not be taken too literally because
underlying accounting principles are far away from standard conceptions of
responsibility. Rather, inequalities according to carbon footprint are more of
a stylistic exercise that would give the distribution of responsibilities if they
10
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were concentrated in the act of purchasing.
Losing sight of the fact that this is a stylistic exercise makes consumers
take on a responsibility that is well beyond the limited sphere of their decisions and control. This leads to conceiving emissions mitigation primarily
in terms of lifestyle changes, consumption patterns, consumer choices. The
consumer’s choice of equipment (e.g. internal combustion engine, hybrid or
electric?) will therefore be discussed, and not an organisation of space that
makes a motorised vehicle necessary or a development of infrastructure that
facilitates the use of the automobile. This is the discourse of responsible consumption and the small gestures of each individual, a discourse that is quite
influential in public communication (Comby, 2015). However, the reductions
in emissions associated with changes in consumer behaviour and investment,
while not negligible, are not sufficient and must be supplemented by structuring actions on the part of companies and public authorities (Dugast and
Soyeux, 2019). Bringing ecological inequalities into the debate has the paradoxical effect of reinforcing this individualistic and moralising framing, to
the detriment of highlighting collective decisions and actions to be carried
out jointly (Marshall, 2017, chap. 36).
For the purposes of this exercise, we have nevertheless chosen to work
within this individualistic framing; however, we wanted to retain a reminder
of the integration of individuals, and their emissions, into various interlocking collective structures. Therefore, we have not calculated emissions at the
individual level but instead at the immediately higher (collective) level of the
household. The household is the statistical unit at which consumer spending is observed. It is also the social unit within which many consumption
services, and therefore the emissions that are attributed to them, are carried
out and pooled from the point of view of the individuals that make it up.
While the logic of consumption-based accounting makes it possible in
theory to go down to the level of the individual, its implementation comes
up against two pitfalls: the first is a practical pitfall because it would be
necessary to say which member of the household benefits and in what proportion of the goods and services whose buying is observed at the household
level; and the second is a conceptual pitfall because it would be necessary to
define a convention for allocating pooled emissions (the heating of a dwelling
benefits all its occupants). The latter is analogous at the household level to
the one that we will encounter later at the national level (i.e. how to attribute emissions from pooled public consumption, e.g. national defence, to
households?). These pitfalls are usually circumvented by dividing emissions
by the number of household members. However, we did not want to resort
to this artifice, which at all costs reduces to the individual what is partly
collective.
Calculating emissions per household means that the size of the household is a (upward) factor of the variation of household emissions that we
11
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will calculate. Dividing emissions by household size to obtain emissions per
capita does not eliminate this relation, only reverses it. The irreducible mutual component of emissions means that they cannot be compared regardless
of household size8 : taken at the individual level, emissions are lower for an
individual belonging to a large household than for an individual belonging
to a small one.

2

Carbon footprint inequalities

We now present a panorama of ecological inequalities based on the carbon
footprint of French households, established for the year 2010. This panorama
is congruent with the results obtained for France by an OFCE–Ademe team,
independently of us and from the same data (Malliet, 2020; Malliet et al.,
2020).
In 2010, the total GHG footprint9 of the French economy amounts to
741 MtCO2e . We have allocated to households their direct emissions, emissions embodied in their final demand (indirect emissions), as well as the
emissions embodied in final demand of government10 . The total emissions
allocated correspond in the end to 615 MtCO2e , or on average 22.1 tCO2e
per household (9.9 tCO2e per capita), which is slightly less than the average
26.7 tCO2e per households (11.4 tCO2e per capita) when all the components
of the national carbon footprint are taken into account.
To reconstitute the carbon footprint of households, the emissions of the
final demand of households have been allocated according to current consumption expenditures, which are given by the Household Budget survey of
INSEE. The principle is similar for direct emissions (see appendix B.1.2).
Emissions from final demand of government were allocated according to a
civic principle11 , which allocates these emissions in proportion to the number
of people per household: 2 tCO2e are thus allocated to a family of average
size and composition (0.9 tCO2e per capita).

2.1

Carbon footprint and income

Figure 1 shows the carbon footprint, segmented by broad category of goods
or services, for each decile of living standard. Households are segmented by
standard of living (disposable income divided by the number of consumption
8
See Underwood and Zahran (2015) for a discussion, as well as Gough et al. (2012, §3.
1 and §5), Büchs and Schnepf (2013, p. 118) or Weber and Matthews (2008, p. 385).
9
In this article, GHG emissions are always expressed in tons of CO2 equivalent (for a
technical-political history of this metric, see Pottier, 2020; for the physical limits of this
equivalence, see Fuglestvedt et al., 2003), although the emissions of the section 3 and 3.1
are CO2 emissions only. On the source of the data, see annex A.
10
For more details, on the components of national carbon footprint and on the scope of
the allocated emissions, see B.1.1.
11
See Appendix B.1.1 for a discussion of alternative choices.
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Figure 1 – Carbon footprint inequalities: Mean annual household emissions
by equivalised disposable income decile, disaggregated by consumption categories. National average: 22.1 tCO2e per household per year.
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units of the household, or equivalised disposable income) and the carbon
footprint is averaged for each group12 . Two effects determine the evolution
of the carbon footprint as a function of the standard of living: the volume
effect (if expenditures are multiplied by two, then the carbon footprint is
multiplied by two) and the structure effect (the change in the distribution
of expenditure between consumption items changes the carbon footprint to
the extent that the items have different emission contents).
Emissions increase with the living standards of households: a household
belonging to the richest 10% (D10) emits 33 tCO2e , on average 2.2 times more
than an average household belonging to the poorest 10% (D1), which emits
15 tCO2e . This increase is mainly explained by the increase in expenditure
(volume effect) because the ratio of average annual expenditure between D10
and D1 is 2.8. It should be noted in passing that income disparities are even
greater (ratio between D10 and D1 of 8.8) because the fraction allocated to
current consumption falls when income increases, the rest being saved13 .
The structure effect results from the combination of different emission
contents according to consumption items with a change in the structure of
expenditure with the standard of living. This mainly comes from energy
expenditure. On the one hand, energy expenditure has a significantly higher
emissions content than other expenditure (around 3.5 kg CO2 / e compared
to 0.5 kg CO2 / e). On the other hand, energy expenditures grow less quickly
with income than other expenditures: they represent 11.4% of the mean budget of the poorest (D1) versus only 9.3% for the richest (D10). This observation, which has already made by many studies, suggests a certain saturation,
on average, of energy needs. The wealthy carry over their additional budget
to savings and to less emitting expenses: clothing, leisure, culture, restaurant
services. As a result, the ratio of average emissions between D10 and D1 is
lower than that of expenditures. Beyond energy expenditure, the impact of
changing expenditure structure is negligible because the emission content of
energy expenditure is an order of magnitude higher than that of other goods
and services, which are fairly close to each other.

2.2

Horizontal heterogeneity

The averages of carbon footprints mask a great heterogeneity of individual
situations at any income level, which is illustrated in figure 2. The graph 2a
still displays a vertical segmentation of the population by income level, but
12

See B.1.2 for the definition of the consumption categories.
The question of emissions generated by savings could be raised here. However, this
should not be taken into account in consumption-based accounting: although savings
invested generate emissions, they are invested to produce goods; the consumers of these
goods will be charged for the emissions. Meanwhile, income-based accounting considers
that savings emit carbon: it accounts for the emissions enabled by the factors of production
(capital in the form of invested savings, labour), but as a result there are no more emissions
linked to consumption.
13
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(a) First quartile, median and third quartile by equivalised disposable income decile
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(b) Average by equivalised disposable income decile and location

Figure 2 – Carbon footprint inequalities: annual household emissions beyond
average and vertical vision. National average: 22.1 tCO2e per household per
year; national median: 18.9 tCO2e per household per year.
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Quintile of
carbon
footprint

proportion
in QU1 of
income

proportion
in QU2 of
income

proportion
in QU3 of
income

proportion
in QU4 of
income

proportion
in QU5 of
income

QU1
QU2
QU3
QU4
QU5

37.4
23.5
18.5
12.7
7.8

25.8
22.7
22.6
17.5
11.3

17.6
21.7
20.7
21.2
18.7

12.2
18.2
21.0
23.6
24.9

6.9
13.8
17.2
25.0
37.2

Table 1 – Proportion of equivalised income quintiles in each quintile of carbon
footprint.
Reading: In the second quintile of carbon footprint, 21.7% belongs to the
third quintile of equivalised income.

instead of showing the average carbon footprints as in Figure 1 it shows the
median values (as many households above as below), as well as the first and
third quartile of the carbon footprints within each decile of living standards.
It is clear from this figure that there is a great deal of heterogeneity14 within
each decile and that this heterogeneity is not related to income. Indeed,
households in the highest emitting quarter of D1 emit more than households
in the lowest emitting quarter of D10.
Another way to visualise this heterogeneity is to examine the composition
in terms of income (per consumption unit) class of the 20% households that
emit the more or the less (see table 1). Among the 20% households that
emit the more, we find 37.2% of the households in QU5, and 19.1% in the
two lowest quintiles of the income distribution. The situation is similar for
the lowest emitting households: 37.4% of households in the lowest quintile
of income, 19.1% in the two highest quintiles of income.
The graph 2b enables us to apprehend one of the horizontal dimensions of
this heterogeneity. It divides income groups according to household location
(rural, suburban, urban centre). Meanwhile, the averages by location and
by income level provide a much less clear-cut picture. The carbon footprint
always tends to increase with income for each location, although in a less
monotonous way, but location is also a determining factor for the level of
the carbon footprint. For the same decile of standard of living, living in an
urban centre systematically leads to a lower average footprint than for other
locations; at the top of the income distribution, suburban households tend
to have the highest average footprints.
In the following section, we will encounter other horizontal dimensions of
14

These estimates of variability should be taken with caution, for more details see the
discussion in the annex B.1.3.
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emissions inequality when analyzing energy-related emissions from housing
and transportation using databases that allow a greater diversity of technical,
geographic and socio-demographic factors to be considered. The methodology followed here, which is expenditure-based and uses average emission
content per euro spent, is likely to overestimate the effect of income relative
to other factors of variability, particularly because it neglects the dispersion
of physical factors that determine household energy emissions for housing
and transport.

2.3

Elasticities of the carbon footprint

A common way to summarise the relationship between income or expenditures and carbon footprint is to compute the elasticity of carbon footprint
with respect to income or expenditures. We compute here these elasticities
; that is, we estimate the following equation:
log CFi =  log Xi + ui

(1)

where CFi is total carbon footprint of household i, Xi is total income
or total expenditures of household i, and ui is the error term. The results
are given in table 2. One can see that the progression of carbon footprint
with respect to expenditure is more important than with respect to income.
This is a consequence of increased savings with income. One can also see
that the coefficient of determination is much larger when the regressor is
expenditures than when it is income. This means that the household carbon footprint is tied more closely to their expenditures than to their income.
This happens because consumption-based emissions are tightly linked to consumption, which is acquired by expenditures.
The elasticity that we have computed is the unconditional elasticity (i.e.
there are no econometric controls). Conditional elasticity (i.e. elasticity with
respect to expenditure or income when other factors are fixed) is generally
different from unconditional elasticity because the other factors that are
not controlled for in the unconditional elasticity are usually correlated with
income or expenditure. To estimate the conditional elasticity, one simply
introduces controls in equation (1). This is regularly done in multivariate
analyses with various sets of controls (Büchs and Schnepf, 2013; Ala-Mantila
et al., 2014; Nässén, 2014; Fremstad et al., 2018; Gill and Moeller, 2018;
Zsuzsa Lévay et al., 2020).
One set of factors is particularly relevant as controls: the size and composition of households. Household economics has indeed revealed economies
of scale in large households by pooling together equipments and resources.
This is also the case for carbon footprints (Underwood and Zahran, 2015), as
we have explained earlier. There are several ways to account for the dependence of carbon footprint on the size and composition of households. One
way is to explicitly introduce a control for number of adults and children
17
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independent
variable

expenditures

income

elasticity

0.864

0.530

standard errors

(0.006)

(0.008)

R2

0.640

0.312

Table 2 – Expenditure-elasticity and income-elasticity of carbon footprint,
with standard errors and coefficients of determination

in (1), as in Weber and Matthews (2008). Another common way is to still
estimate unconditional elasticity, but from intensive quantities (per capital
or per consumption units) instead of extensive quantities, as we have done
in table 2.
Here, we wish to understand how the unconditional elasticity varies when
one uses extensive values or various forms of intensive values. A literature review of the estimation of elasticities of carbon footprint has indeed revealed
that several forms are used concurrently in the literature (Pottier, 2021).
We have therefore regressed equation (1) when CFi can be now either total carbon footprint (as previously), carbon footprint per capita or carbon
footprint per consumption unit (c.u.), and Xi can be total expenditures (as
previously), or expenditures per capita, or expenditures per c.u. (also known
as equivalised expenditures, and correspondingly for income). The effects of
household size and composition can be accounted for differently on the two
sides of equation (1), as is sometimes encountered in the literature (e.g. elasticity of carbon footprint per capita with respect to income per consumption
units). This gives nine possible forms of “expenditure-elasticity of carbon
footprint” (and again nine for income). Tables 3 and 4 display the result.
One can see that these choices have a strong impact on the value of
elasticity reported, even when we have accounted for household size and
composition consistently on both sides of the estimating equations. This
highlights the necessity to be explicit about whether per capita, total, or
possibly per c.u. values are used.

18
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expenditure
carbon footprint
carbon footprint
per capita
carbon footprint
per c.u.

expenditure
per capita

expenditure
per c.u.

0.864
0.403
0.747
(6.4 × 10−3 ) (1.1 × 10−2 ) (9.8 × 10−3 )
0.441
0.750
0.750
(8.1 × 10−3 ) (6.5 × 10−3 ) (7.7 × 10−3 )
0.614
0.601
0.751
(6.5 × 10−3 ) (7.4 × 10−3 ) (7.1 × 10−3 )

Table 3 – Expenditure-elasticity of carbon footprint, depending on the use
of total, per capita or per consumption units, for the independent variable
and the dependent variable
Reading: Elasticity of carbon footprint per capita with respect to expenditure
is 0.441. Standard errors in parenthesis.

income
carbon footprint
carbon footprint
per capita
carbon footprint
per c.u.

income per
capita

income per
c.u.

0.530
0.169
0.395
−3
−2
(7.7 × 10 ) (1.0 × 10 ) (1.0 × 10−2 )
0.158
0.401
0.337
(8.0 × 10−3 ) (8.0 × 10−3 ) (8.7 × 10−3 )
0.308
0.298
0.359
(7.2 × 10−3 ) (8.1 × 10−3 ) (8.3 × 10−3 )

Table 4 – Income-elasticity of carbon footprint, depending on the use of total,
per capita or per consumption units, for the independent variable and the
dependent variable
Reading: Elasticity of carbon footprint per c.u. with respect to income per
capita is 0.298. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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3

Inequalities in emissions from energy services:
housing and transport

We now focus on emission15 inequalities from two major categories of energy
service: those related to transport and those related to housing. These
emissions include, but are not limited to, emissions from the combustion of
fossil fuels directly by households. If direct combustion could have been a
coherent perimeter, then we felt it would be more relevant to reason in terms
of functional unit in relation to the energy services provided to households so
as not to differentiate between those who use their personal equipment and
those who purchase these services. The emissions covered here thus take
into account both direct household emissions (from combustion of vehicle
gasoline) and those of producers of equivalent services (gasoline for buses),
but not indirect emissions (emissions from the construction of the car or bus,
emissions for refining gasoline). This includes more or less carbon-intensive
ways of providing the same service, whether or not fossil energy combustion
is operated by households.
There are two reasons to focus on emissions from private transport and
housing. From a climate policy point of view, they represent two major components of French emissions and they are the focus of government action.
They are also directly related to household behaviour. From a methodological point of view, surveys are available for these two items. This makes
it possible to reconstruct physical data rather than amounts of expenditure.
These data sources provide more precise information on the diversity of practices, physical and technical factors governing the heterogeneity of emissions.

3.1

Transport emissions

Transport emissions16 by standard of living and their variabilities are presented in figures 3 and 4. They progress monotonously: the poorest (D1)
emit on average 1.6 tCO2e per household per year and the richest (D10)
5.4 tCO2e (i.e. a D10/D1 ratio of 3.4 for all emissions). However, the diagnosis can be refined by distinguishing between emissions from local and
long-distance mobility. Emissions from local mobility rise sharply from the
lower middle classes, but peak beyond that. For the richest half of the population, they remain around 2.4 tCO2e per household per year, which leads to
a rather low D10/D1 ratio of 2.3. In contrast, emissions from long-distance
mobility progress more slowly but more strongly in the upper deciles, and
this is even more marked for aircraft-related emissions. For their long dis15

This section deals only with CO2 emissions and not other GHG, even if the unit is
still tCO2e .
16
We used the INSEE (2008) National Transport and Travel Survey and a modelling of
the technical characteristics of private vehicles, see the technical appendix. For another
exploitation of this survey, see Longuar et al. (2010).
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tance trips, D10 households emit 3.1 tCO2e , including 1.7 for air travel, which
corresponds to long distance emissions 1.5 times higher than those households in D9 (2.1 times for air travel), and very strongly higher than those
households in D1 (5.2 times and 15 times for air travel).
The strong income-dependent growth of long-distance mobility thus contrasts sharply with the relative stagnation of local mobility. However, the
determinants of these mobilities differ: local trips are largely driven by necessity (going to work, school, shopping, etc.) and are more constrained than
long-distance trips, which are often associated with leisure. These leisure
activities, which are more accessible to the upper classes, are also those over
which households have a greater degree of choice and control.
At any level of standard of living, the differences in CO2 emissions are
very large (figure 4). Dispersion increases within each decile, with the interquartile range increasing from 2 tCO2e within D1 to 7.2 tCO2e within D10.
Location and distance from dense urban areas immediately shows part of the
variability (graph 4b): emissions vary greatly, at each level of standard of
living, depending on whether one lives in a rural area (3.9 tCO2e ), in a suburb (3.4 tCO2e ) or in a city centre (2.4 tCO2e ). The particular situation of
rural people had already been noted by previous studies (Büchs and Schnepf
(2013, p. 120-121) for the United Kingdom, Gill and Moeller (2018) for Germany). But above all, 53% of urban dwellers emit less than 1% for their
transport, but only 35% of rural households and 38% of suburban households. Thus, once again, we see that very different situations exist within
these groups.
This variability in CO2 emissions can be decomposed by observing differences in the energy services consumed (mobility, measured in km travelled)
and differences in the modes of transport used, which determine the energy
consumption required to travel these km (energy efficiency) and the CO2
emitted (energy sources and their carbon contents).
Depending on income level, there is a clear progression in mobility (figure
5b). Wealthy households belonging to the D10 travel an average of 50,000
km per year, almost 3 times more than the poorest households in the D1 who
travel 17,000 km. The accessibility of transport equipment can play a role:
the proportion of households without a private car decreases continuously
with the standard of living, from 47% for the poorest 10% to 8% for the
richest 10%. Local mobility is increasing rapidly: from 10,700 km for the
D1 to 18,500 km for the D4, it then peaks at around 21,000 km from the
D5. Long-distance mobility is growing exponentially: households on the D10
travel 12 800 km by plane, those within D1 850 km.
Differences in mobility are well reflected in differences in emissions. Indeed, the modes of transport that are used today mainly function with fossil
fuels (73% of journeys are made in private vehicles, and 10% by plane, see
figure 5c). Active modes (cycling, walking) are limited to short-distance mobility, while rail and public transport for short and long distances are only
21
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Figure 3 – Transport emission inequalities: annual average emissions by
equivalised disposable income decile, disaggregated by type of mobility. National average: 3.4 tCO2e per household per year.
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(a) By equivalised disposable income decile
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(b) By equivalised disposable income decile and location

Figure 4 – Variability of transport emissions: first quartile, median and third
quartile of annual emissions. National average: 3.4 tCO2e per household per
year; national median: 2.5 tCO2e per household per year.
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used for a very limited fraction of the kilometres travelled. With regard to
the consumption of fossil fuels per distance travelled, differences in energy
efficiency play a small role: the order of magnitude of the consumption per
100 km is similar between airplanes and private vehicles and for the latter
the carbon content of the kilometre travelled by car varies very little. The
size and weight of top-of-the-range vehicles are largely offset by better fuel
efficiency, so that consumption per kilometre increases little with income.
Overall, emissions are today primarily correlated with distance travelled.
Locations and distance to dense urban areas have a strong influence on
emissions because they condition both mobility (kilometres travelled, figure
5b) and the available modes of transport (figure 5c). Rural people have a
higher annual mobility: a rural household travels about 35,000 km per year,
a suburban household 32,000 km, an urban household 25,500 km. However,
in all modes of transport, rural people emit more because they cover larger
distances. It is true that urban dwellers emit more for their long-distance,
more frequent journeys, because they use airplanes more often (0.6 tCO2e for
a household in the city centre, 0.5 tCO2e in the suburbs and 0.3 tCO2e for a
rural household, see discussion of emissions in appendix B.5).
The kilometres travelled for local mobility and the dependence on individual vehicles for these journeys (mostly thermal engines, the most emitting
mode of transport per kilometre travelled) are greater for rural dwellers. In
particular, 11% of rural households do not have a vehicle, compared to 17%
in the suburbs and 33% in the city centre. Travel by car and two-wheeled
vehicles accounts for about 84 percent of kilometres travelled, compared to
73 percent in the suburbs and 55 percent in the city centre. The use of
public transport is much less frequent and possible (8% kilometres travelled,
compared to 14% in the suburbs and 24% in the centres), as is active walking
and cycling (2% kilometres of short-distance travel, compared to 4% in the
suburbs and 8% in the city). No doubt more extensive data would make it
possible to highlight more specific constraints, such as those of people from
overseas territories, who can only use the plane to get to metropolitan France.
Moreover, the use of airplanes is more the prerogative of households located
in urban centres rather than in the countryside, with (when we look more
closely) a concentration of households located in large cities and particularly
in the Parisian agglomeration (Bouffard-Savary, 2010, p. 197). Infrastructure supply, access to transport technologies, distances to be travelled, and
so on, are all important factors in explaining the disparity in emissions. However, these factors are very loosely correlated to income and are not directly
controlled by household choices but rather by urban and land use planning
policies.
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(a) Transport emissions by equivalised disposable income decile and location, disaggregated by type of mobility
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(b) Kilometres travelled by equivalised disposable income decile and location, disaggregated by type of mobility

Figure 5 – Transport emissions and technical factors
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(c) Average proportion of transport modes (weighted by kilometres travelled), by
equivalised disposable income decile and by location

Figure 5 – Transport emissions and technical factors
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3.2

Housing emissions

Emissions related to energy services at home17 highlight other dynamics
and further moderate the role of standard of living, which is in line with
the literature. Figure 6 presents the national averages per income decile
according to the different uses of energy at home (e.g. heating, cooking,
hot water, and electricity for appliances). While the poorest (D1) emit
less than the richest (D10) (1.8 tCO2e as against 3.2 tCO2e per household
and per year), the progression of emissions with standard of living is rather
uneven, which suggests a great variability and is confirmed by examining the
variability within each decile (figure 7). Dispersion here is extreme, with no
clear trend according to income. The breakdown according to geographical
areas shows that the location captures a certain amount of variability. On
average, an urban household emits 1.4 tCO2e for housing against 2.6 tCO2e
in rural areas and 2.4 tCO2e in the suburbs, but above all 61% of urban
households emit less than 1 tCO2e , while 61% of rural households and 64%
of suburban households emit more than 1 tCO2e .
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Figure 6 – Inequalities in energy emissions from housing: average by equivalised disposable income decile, disaggregated by use. National average:
2.3 tCO2e per dwelling and per year.
17

We used the Survey on Housing Performance, Equipment, Energy Needs and Uses
(Phébus, 2013).
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(a) By equivalised disposable income decile
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(b) By equivalised disposable income decile and location

Figure 7 – Variability of emissions from housing energy: first quartile, median
and third quartile. National average: 2.3 tCO2e per dwelling and per year;
national median: 1.1 tCO2e .
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The breakdown by use shows that emissions related to hot water or cooking display no net variation, while those related to electricity consumption
(that of equipment) increase slightly with the standard of living and vary
with location but in any case remain small because the carbon content of
French electricity is very low (figure 8a). Note that this characteristic does
not stem from a household choice but from a political (and contested) choice
in favor of nuclear power. The major source of variability in emissions is
therefore heating, whose emissions constitute 80% of the emissions related
to energy services in housing.
This variability can be decomposed by looking at energy services (dwellings
surface heated in m2 ), energy efficiency (energy spent by m2 ) and the carbon
content of energy. The surface area of the dwellings increase with income
(figure 8b), but also with the proportion of single-family houses. This variable is linked to income, geographic location and urban density. The poorest
10% occupy 75 m2 on average, often in collective housing (65%), while the
richest 10% have access to larger surface areas (126 m2 , which does not include second homes) and they more often own single-family homes (65%).
However, differences in locations and urban density are the main factors of
variability: a rural household occupies on average 111 m2 (88 m2 for a poor
household in D1, 156 m2 for a rich household in D10), 92 m2 in the suburbs (74 m2 for D1, 131 m2 for D10), and 70 m2 in the city center (62 m2
for D1, 95 m2 for D10). The proportion of single-family houses is higher in
rural areas (84%) than in the suburbs (57%) and the city centers (19%). In
particular, the proportion of single-family homes in the suburbs increases
continuously and significantly with income (84% for D10, 26% only for D1).
As regards the annual energy consumption per unit of surface area (kWh /m2 /year),
the correlation with income classes is weak. The richest consume around
124 kWh /m2 /year for their heating, the poorest around 139 kWh /m2 /year.
Meanwhile, the type of housing (e.g. individual housing or apartment building) makes a considerable difference (figure 8c). These aggregate figures hide
very different situations of energy dependency. When analysing these disparities in real energy consumptions, the distinction is rarely made between
differences in energy efficiency—including the heating systems (old oil-fired
boiler versus new heat pump) and the building (poorly insulated versus passive building)—and differences in practices (heating at 23 ℃ rather than at
18 ℃, even deprivation)18 or needs (depending on the more or less harsh
climate between the north and the south, the coast and the mountains) or
professional occupation (the pensioner who stays at home compared to the
employee who works in a company, see Gough et al., 2012, p. 16-19). For the
poorest and most modest, we are dealing here with the problem of energy
poverty, which is notoriously multifactorial and difficult to identify (Dubois,
18
For an analysis of these consumption factors without social segmentation see Cayla
et al. (2019).
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2012; Ambrosio et al., 2013).
Our survey data allow us to disregard differences in practices and calculate (using the Energy Performance Diagnosis method) the theoretical levels of consumption, which takes into account climate-related heating needs
(annual degree-hours), housing performance (energy loss per surface unit)
and the energy efficiency of heating systems. This in-depth examination
shows that the energy performance of heating systems and dwellings is correlated with the income of the occupants (figure 8d). This correlation is
even stronger with the occupancy status of the dwelling (owner or tenant),
the owners’ power to act being a major factor in initiating the necessary
renovation works (Bourgeois et al., 2019).
It should not be inferred from this that, in this context, the surfaces to
be heated determine the emissions. In contrast to transport, energy services
in housing explain to a limited extent the variability of emissions due to
heterogeneous technical systems. While in transport the technology is (for
the time being) relatively homogeneous, with a dominance of oil-powered
private cars, the technical characteristics of dwellings and heating systems
are more diverse. This diversity primarily explains the variability of housing
energy emissions because the emission factor can be very different depending
on the heating system (i.e. gas or oil-fired boiler, electric radiator, heat
pump, wood stove, or connection to a heating network).
The distribution of these systems has little to do with the standard of
living of the households, which explains why emissions from housing energy
are much less correlated with income than those from transport (Figure 8e,
left). About half of households are equipped with heating systems that run
on fossil fuels (gas and oil). This proportion is roughly the same for each
decile of living standards. However, this proportion changes strongly with
geographical location and density (Figure 8e, right). It is slightly lower in
rural areas (40%), to the benefit of electric and wood heating systems, which
tempers the effect of larger surfaces to heat on emissions but at the expense
of energy efficiency (and indoor air quality for wood). Moreover, this low
share reflects more the deficit in the installation of gas boilers because the
share of oil boilers is higher than in the city (20%, compared to 7% in the
suburbs and only 1% in the city centre). Conversely, the share of fossil
energy is higher in the suburbs because the gas network is well-developed,
while urban heating networks are not very extensive (7% versus 16% in the
city centre). We see here the emergence of structuring factors for the choice
of housing energy, factors that households can only influence at the margin.
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(a) Housing energy emissions by equivalised disposable income decile and location,
disaggregated by use
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(b) Average surface area of dwellings, by equivalised disposable income decile and
location

Figure 8 – Housing energy emissions and technical factors
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(c) Actual heating consumption (kWh /m2 /year), by equivalised disposable income
decile and type of housing
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(d) Theoretical heating consumption (kWh /m2 /year), by equivalised disposable
income and type of dwelling

Figure 8 – Housing energy emissions and technical factors
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(e) Proportion of energy sources used for heating, by equivalised disposable income
decile and location

Figure 8 – Housing energy emissions and technical factors
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4

On the links between income inequalities, ecological inequalities and responsibility

We discuss here some methodological problems related to the establishment
of a link between income inequalities and ecological inequalities. We also
question the relevance, in this context, of consumption-based accounting of
emissions.

4.1

The quality effect

Carbon footprint increases on average with income because wealthier households spend more than poorer ones, there is also a mechanical link between
the amount of expenditure and the amount of emissions (volume effect). It
should be noted that this mechanical link is the result of the method that is
used to calculate the carbon footprint of households from expenditures.
Indeed, by multiplying the expenditures in value (euros spent) by a constant emission content (tCO2 / e), the method followed implicitly assumes
that, within a same expenditure category, emissions are proportional to expenditures. By construction, it makes apparent that there is a linear volume
effect: doubling expenditures double the carbon footprint.
One should not hastily conclude that it represents the true link between
emissions and expenditures for emissions actually doubles with expenditures
only when quantities consumed also double. However, if a household spends
600 e on a washing machine instead of 300 e, it is generally not to buy two
machines at 300 ebut to acquire a different and more expensive model. This
good is more expensive not because its production required twice as much
material and generated twice as much emission, but because it is of a different
quality. The content of emissions per euro is then generally no longer the
same and the variations in expenditure do not reflect proportional variations
in emissions: this is the quality effect, which could reinforce the volume
effect (if higher expenditures have a higher emission content) or temper it
(if higher expenditures have a lower emission content).
It is possible that the quality effect tempers the volume effect, and thus
that the method leads to an overestimation of the emissions of the betteroff classes (Davison, 2016, p. 347). Indeed, luxury goods are expensive because they incorporate more labour, which does not contribute to emissions19
(Lenzen, 1998, p. 914-915). Thus, the emissions corresponding to a meal in
a café or a three-star restaurant would not be proportional to the addition.
The part of the price linked to reputation or scarcity is in the same direction.
19

In national accounts, the consumption that, one would say in Marxist terms, is related
to the “reproduction of the labour force”, is considered part of final consumption by the
workers and is not an intermediary input of the production. Consequently, in consumptionbased accounting, pure labour does not contribute to the emissions of the goods.
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Between a Romané-Conti and a generic Bourgogne, the emissions should not
be very different, while the price varies from one to a thousand.
Quantitative evidence supports this anecdotal evidence. For a durable
consumption good such as a car, when you move up the range, the trend
in emissions per euro spent is downwards: at the lower end of the range,
producing a city car emits 4.6 tCO2e , whereas in the middle of the range,
with prices doubling, producing a MPV emits 7.2, a family car 5.4 and an
SUV 5.5 20 . In the construction sector, bio-sourced materials, which emit
less, are generally more expensive (Cerema, 2017), as is low-emitting cement
(Allix, 2019).
In more detail, Girod and Haan (2010) compared estimates based on
monetary expenditure and physical quantities using a Swiss consumption
survey that provided information on both. They conclude that there is a
significant decrease in the expenditure elasticity of emissions when the quality effect is taken into account. De Lauretis (2017, p. 55-56) reproduces this
calculation from detailed data taken from the diaries of the French Household Budget survey for 64 categories of food goods. The difference between
the price paid by D10 and D1 varies greatly from one category to another but
is positive for 57 food items, which suggests a non-negligible quality effect.
The example of beef, whose production emits a lot of GHGs, is noteworthy.
The richest 10% buy on average 72% more expensive their kg of meat than
the poorest 10%. Assuming similar modes of production (GHGs emitted /
kg of red meat produced nearby), the same amount of money spent by the
richest people on beef means lower emissions.
Even if the quality effect would need to be more precisely quantified, given
the existing literature, it is highly likely that the most expensive goods have
a lower carbon content per euro, and therefore that the quality effect tempers
the volume effect. This means that the progression of carbon footprint with
income or expenditures could actually be less than what is estimated by the
method.

4.2

Emissions of the “1%”

Before concluding, we should mention the emissions of the Carbon footprints
of the 1% (i.e. the hundredth part of the population who earn the most),
which have been the subject of public debate since an estimate of their
emissions circulated in the autumn of 201821 . This estimate was derived from
20

From life cycle analyses carried out by Renault for Twingo, Scénic, Mégane and Khadjar models, respectively.
21
For France, Jean Gadrey (2018) announced a ratio of 40 between the average emissions
of the poorest 10% and those of the top 1%, a figure that has since been abundantly
quoted. The rest of this article should sufficiently show the reader that we are reluctant
to deliver our own estimates, both because of methodological problems and because of
questions of principle. However, given that “any number beats no number” (Gingras,
2014), we point out that, according to our assessment of carbon footprint disparities,
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previous studies (Piketty and Chancel, 2015; Oxfam, 2015), which follows a
different method than ours. In this section, we present this method and we
also detail its limitations.
This so-called top-down method22 assumes a given relationship between
emissions and a predictor variable, usually income. This assumed relationship usually takes the form of a constant income-elasticity of CO2 emissions.
>From the distribution of the predictor, it allows us to estimate a distribution of emissions that is not too far from reality if the relation between
emissions and the predictor is robust. Its interest is revealed when the proxy
variable is known more easily than emissions. Its main weakness is that
it is a derived method that is based on those already presented: it requires
that previous statistical studies had established and estimated independently
a robust relationship between emissions and the predictor. The top-down
method then applies the relationship (estimated by a few studies – which
are, moreover, heterogeneous in terms of their attribution conventions) to
other contexts, in which it is not possible to test the reliability of the statistical relationship because emissions would then have to be estimated directly,
which would render the method unattractive.
Three additional limitations should be noted.
First, by using a predictor that is weakly correlated with emissions, this
method reinforces the large uncertainties in final results. The predominant
choice of income as a predictor is not very fortunate because carbon footprints are highly correlated with the overall amount of expenditures but less
so with income. This is not surprising given the way that they are calculated, which neglects the quality effect. As we have seen in section 2.3,
income elasticities are also lower than expenditure elasticities because the
richest spend less as a proportion of their income (i.e. save more) than the
poorest. Lenzen (1998) thus gives an income elasticity of 0.5, Büchs and
Schnepf (2013) find an income elasticity of 0.6 or 0.43 when conditioning on
other household characteristics (for an extensive review of the income and
expenditure elasticities of household carbon footprint, see Pottier, 2021. The
Oxfam study uses an income-elasticity of 1, where our own estimations from
this ratio is between 2.2 and 5.2. (between 2.4 and 5.9 if government emissions are not
included, whose attribution according to the civic principle reduces the progressiveness of
carbon footprints). Presented differently, the emissions of the top 10% cumulate 14.7% of
emissions attributed to households, and the emissions of the 1% cumulate between 1.47%
and 3.46% of the total. In these estimates, the lower bound corresponds to assuming that
the emissions of the top 1% equal the emissions of the other percentiles of the last decile;
while the upper bound corresponds to assuming that the emissions attributed to those
other percentiles of the last decile equal the emissions of the previous decile, with the top
1% concentrating emissions above that level. If D9 and D10 are the mean emissions per
household of D9 and D10, then the lower bound for the mean emissions per household in
the top 1% is D10 and the upper bound is D9 + 10 ∗ (D10 − D9).
22
It was introduced by Chakravarty et al. (2009). Grubler and Pachauri (2009) had
already criticised it by showing that the elasticity was not stable. See Weber and Matthews
(2008, p. 383-384) for the test of different functional forms.
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the micro-data gives something between 0.53 and 0.4. It is thus no wonder
that the Oxfam study grossly overestimates the concentration of emissions
with income. Applied to our data, the income elasticity of 1 would give a
ratio of mean emissions of D10 to mean emissions of D1 of 8.8 (i.e. as the
income ratio), where our study finds 2.2.
Second, this method is based on the problematic assumption that emissions are highly correlated with living standards (i.e. it assumes very homogeneous lifestyles at each level of standard of living). By construction,
it reduces the variability of emissions and ecological inequalities to income
inequalities because by methodological assumption the former mirrors the
latter. Thus, the social justice issues of the ecological transition are artificially reduced to the sole issue of income redistribution. As we have seen
earlier, ecological inequalities nevertheless raise questions of inequalities that
are specific and not related to income.
Third, the proxy variable approach is generally fragile, and even more so
when it is applied to the tail end of the income distribution (the 1%). Because
there is very little observation and physical data related to the lifestyles of
the very-rich, it is hardly possible to calibrate the elasticity and the use of the
constant value (over the whole income distribution) is very unreliable. The
relationship between emissions and income, which is already problematic
in the core of the distribution, is now, at the extreme upper limit of the
distribution, only an extrapolation. To overcome this lack of information,
one would have to gather direct observations of the budgets and quantities
consumed by the very-rich23 , whereas statistical surveys are not suited to
target such a narrow segment of the population (the very top incomes). The
uncertainty related to the quality effect would also have to be reduced to get
a reliable estimate but (to our knowledge) no serious effort has been made
in this direction. This means that the consumption of the super-rich and
the associated carbon footprint will remain insufficiently characterised for a
long time to come, and therefore subject of all sorts of suppositions.

4.3

Madonna’s “Emissions”: attribution principles and responsibility

Beyond this impenetrable statistical fog, the case of the super-rich once again
raises the very question of the relevance of consumption-based accounting to
identify ecological inequalities. We will look again at this issue through the
lens of an example.
On 7 July 2007, the Live Earth concert was held around the world, which
was labelled as “the concerts for a climate in crisis”, a series of concerts to
raise awareness of climate change. In London, Madonna performed a song
specially penned for the occasion, called Hey You. The BBC denounced the
23

see Otto et al. (2019) for an attempt in this direction.

37

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2021

39

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1333 [2021]

hypocrisy of the pop star, a great polluter with a high carbon footprint in
spite of her beautiful lyrics24 : in one year, Madonna emitted over a thousand
tons of CO2 .
What are these “emissions” from Madonna? From what we can understand25 , these emissions include the emissions generated by her real estate,
her consumption, her trips around the world to give her concerts, as well as
those of her team that follows her. From an attribution point of view, we
aggregate here the emissions of Madonna as a consumer and the emissions of
Madonna as a singer (i.e. as the producer of an “entertainment service”). In
consumption-based accounting, Madonna’s (final-consumer) emissions would
be lower because the emissions related to her world tours would not be attributable to Madonna as a consumer but to the final consumers—those who
go to her concerts and consume her entertainment service. In this approach,
what the huge “carbon footprint” thus calculated26 reveals is less Madonna’s
polluting lifestyle than the pollution generated by the music industry, which
transports global stars across the planet to produce entertainment.
This calculation of emissions “from” Madonna raises the very question
of the relevance of consumption-based accounting. Aggregating emissions
that are somehow related to Madonna, and not only to her consumption,
highlights the different social roles played by the “Queen of Pop”. Madonna is
not just a consumer who guides companies’ strategies, production techniques
and supply through her purchases. She is an artist at the head of a company
whose activity emits CO2 . She is an influencer: her life choices, her way
of being feed the dreams of millions of fans, who are otherwise consumers.
She is certainly an investor who invests her fortune in companies, and as a
shareholder she can influence the companies decisions.
The fact that different social roles and positions are held applies, with
varying degrees, to everyone—everyone is at least a consumer and a citizen
with a right to vote, often also a producer. If, as we have defended here,
everyone can only have an imperfect influence on the emissions attributed
to their consumption, then this also means that everyone has other channels
for reducing emissions around them, through their political choices as well as
through their professional decisions. This is why, for example, some artists
(Cadieux, 2020) or researchers, with the Lab 1 point 5 initiative (Michaut,
24

which were so moving and topical, such as “Hey, you, don’t you give up // It’s not so
bad // There’s still a chance for us” or “Hey, you, save yourself // Don’t rely on anyone
else”.
25
The work was done by the environmental auditing firm Carbon Footprint, founded by
John Buckley. When contacted, he could not give us any details on the method used; we
were bound to reconstruct the method according to what was published in the newspapers
(BBC, 2007; Irvine, 2008).
26
At the risk of insisting, this is not a carbon footprint in the sense that we have given to
the term and that we find in the academic literature, that consumption-based accounting
that attributes to each person the emissions necessary to produce their final consumption,
and only those emissions.

38

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1333

40

Pottier et al.: Who emits CO2? Landscape of ecological inequalities in Franc

2020), commit to emitting less in the exercise of their profession.
The super-rich and powerful have the characteristic of accumulating a
large number of positions, and in each one of widening and deepening control and power far beyond what ordinary people can achieve. The social
role and positions listed give Madonna a grip on a wide range of emissions,
beyond the one thousand tonnes computed and publicised by the BBC, and
therefore give her a share of responsibility in the collective goal to reduce
these emissions27 . In return, these social and power positions give her important levers to reduce emissions. As a result, the carbon footprint poorly
reflects all of the emissions that the decisions of the super-rich could avoid
(i.e. the emissions for which they are, in a sense, responsible28 . The case
of the super-rich thus puts the issue of attributions back to the centre and
draws, by contrast, a vision of responsibility based on the control over emissions and the wiggle room to reduce them.

4.4

Wiggle room and power to act

Enlightened by this illustrative example, let us go back to the carbon footprint of the ordinary consumer and reason in terms of the wiggle room that
they have on “their” emissions. Let us take the example of heating, which
is a major component in the household footprint and a major factor in the
variability of emissions. The situation implicitly taken as a reference, the one
that best justifies responsibility for emissions, is that of a household owning
a single-family house: as owner, the household “chooses” the insulation of
the house, the heating mode, and the thermostatic control. Even in this
ideal case, the wiggle room to reduce emissions from heating is not equal for
all because some households may not have access to certain energies (e.g.
rural households cannot heat with city gas, as we have seen), nor to credit
to finance energy insulation. At the other end of the spectrum, a tenant
in a social and collective housing unit has no leeway on the emissions from
heating their flat. Between these two polar cases, there will be a continuum
of situations, such as that of an owner dependent on a meeting of co-owners,
or that of an owner connected to a district heating, whose emissions will be
largely conditioned by the choices made by the district heating operator.
The same analysis could be made for home-to-work transport emissions.
Attribution of these emissions to the household is justified by its choices of
location and equipment, which are more or less constrained, because they
27
Here, the responsibility does not arise from the contribution to past emissions, but
from the need to act as far as possible to reduce future emissions. We are thus moving
from a notion of “backward-looking” responsibility to a notion of “forward-looking” moral
responsibility according to which an individual is “virtuous” and responsible if he or she
takes responsibility to act actively to contribute to the common good.
28
Much more than the consumption of the rich, Kempf (2007) denounced their control
on economic and political power and the traction exerted on all social classes by their
ostentatious consumption.
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depend on a complex of factors and decisions (e.g. choice of business location,
choice of land use planning by local authorities and the government, choice
of public transport authority, choice of car manufacturers, etc.). It is not far
from the truth to say that the individual action on emissions of this type
may only act at the margin in comparison with other decision centers and
entities with much more structuring actions.
All of these situations are very different in terms of wiggle room and each
one reveals problems of collective action in addition to individual choices.
However, for each, the attribution of emissions according to the consumption
approach makes these emissions the responsibility of the household and of the
household alone. Moreover, it makes households equally responsible, even
if the “power to act” that they have over their emissions is not comparable.
For example, Pautard (2017) shows that environmental sensitivity has little
influence on transport use, whereas structural factors (e.g. geographical
location, the type of urban area or household composition) have a strong
impact, which suggests that the will of the actors in this area is less important
than the constraints that they face.
This question of the wiggle room available to everyone to reduce their
emissions is crucial to the perception of the justice of the ecological transition.
If, to use the example with which we introduced this article, one considered
it to be unfair that air travel for holidays is not taxed when diesel for private
cars is, then perhaps the reason is not so much because one thought that
travelling by plane emits much more GHGs than driving on diesel (although
lack of knowledge of the orders of magnitude also feeds popular discontent).
Probably, it is much more likely to be because we are confusedly aware that
the wiggle room is not the same. For a poor household living in the country,
keeping and using its old diesel car may be its only option to go to work (i.e.
the household’s members “have no choice”); while a rich household can always
avoid taking the plane and choose like Bourvil to admire the moonlight in
Maubeuge. As noted by Shue (1993), it is important, from the point of view
of justice, to determine whether the emissions are a matter of necessity or
luxury.
To shed light on this debate, the description and presentation of ecological
inequalities in terms of emissions generated by final consumption is of limited
interest. In our context of urgent ecological transition, the examination of
distributional issues should be reformulated to take account of inequalities
in the ability to act on what causes environmental damage.

Conclusion
To quantify ecological inequalities in France, we have adopted the most
widespread convention, which attributes to households the emissions generated by the production and use of the products and services they con40
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sume (i.e. consumption-based accounting). Although the carbon footprint
of households tends to increase with income, there is also a strong variability that is not linked to income but to geographical, socio-demographic and
technical factors. These factors constrain dependency on fossil fuels and
therefore emissions in the short term. Ecological inequalities are therefore
not a copy of income inequalities.
Detailing the steps involved in quantifying a panorama of carbon footprints helps to recall and underline the fact that the carbon footprint is not
a factual observation of emission sources: it is based on empirical data, but
these data are processed by a calculation that attributes emissions to agents.
Because emissions result from multiple and embedded individual and collective choices, decisions constrained by inherited structures, and conjunctions
of actions carried out by diverse agents with heterogeneous capacities, the
assumptions required to attribute these emissions to final agents will always
be conventional and subject to debate. The attribution conventions determine “who emits CO2 ”. Our goal has not been to defend one accounting
convention among all of those possible, nor a particular conception of responsibility related to GHG emissions. We wanted above all to point out
that attribution conventions always convey a particular representation of responsibility, regardless of the precautions taken, and that, consequently, one
cannot dissociate discussion of ways of measuring ecological inequalities from
a discussion of responsibility.
Because it tends to frame the problem in terms of individual responsibility, the initial question of “who emits CO2 ?” may not be the most relevant.
A relevant contribution of a panorama of ecological inequalities cannot be in
a quantification of the responsibility for GHG emissions of different classes
of households. However detailed and precise this quantification may be, its
value and relevance is always dependent on the choice of particular conventions, controversial assumptions, that have to be adopted to carry it out.
Such an panorama is of interest not for the final result as such (i.e. who
emits), but because it highlights the processes and the technical, economic,
social, political, geographical or demographic factors that produce emissions.
In short, because it answers the question of “How is CO2 emitted”?
The focus should be on describing the specific factors that both cause
many emissions and are unevenly distributed in the population. In particular, identifying those factors that combine in particular situations of high
dependency would be highly politically relevant. This analysis is data intensive and requires significant work to be carried out to gather and reconcile
many statistical sources. This will help us to better describe the differences
in wiggle room and power to act, and to identify the situations to which
policies to foster a just ecological transition will have to provide solutions.
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Technical appendix
A

Data Sources

The greenhouse gas footprint data for France (CO2 , CH4 , N2 O) come from
the statistical service of the General Commissariat for Sustainable Development of the Ministry of Ecological Transition (SDES). These data are
produced by applying an Input-Output method29 .
Data from the Enquête Budget de Famille (BDF, the French Household
Budget Survey, 2011)30 are used to attribute national carbon footprint data
to a representative sample of more than 10,000 households.
The data on energy consumption, dwelling characteristics, heating equipment and energy uses in principal residences come from the Survey of Housing Performance, Equipment, Energy Needs and Uses (PHEBUS, 2013)31 .
Data on distances travelled, reasons for travel, modes of transportation
and energy sources used by transport modes are taken from the Enquête
nationale transport et déplacements (ENTD, 2008)32 .

B

Data processing

B.1
B.1.1

GHG Footprint Inequalities
Scope of footprint

In 2010, GHG emissions (CO2 , CH4 , N2 O) produced on the national territory
amounted to 481 MtCO2e . These production-based emissions correspond to
goods used for both domestic demand and exports, and do not include GHG
emitted abroad and embedded in imported goods. As explained earlier, the
input-output methodology allows these emissions to be reincorporated and
to compute the GHG footprint of French final domestic demand. The INSEE
estimates the total carbon footprint at 741 MtCO2e , with 370 MtCO2e coming from domestic production (including 139 MtCO2e of direct household
emissions), and practically the same volume coming from imported goods
(371 MtCO2e ). The total GHG footprint of 741 MtCO2e can be decomposed
according to the main aggregates of national accounts: 561 MtCO2e for final
consumption of households (76%), 56 MtCO2e for final demand of govern29

https://www.statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/lempreintecarbone-note-prealable-lelaboration-du-quatrieme-rapport-gouvernementalannuel-au-titre?rubrique=27&dossier=1286.
30
https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2835605?sommaire=2015691
31
https://www.statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/enqueteperformance-de-lhabitat-equipements-besoins-et-usages-de-lenergie-phebus
32
https://www.statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/enquetenationale-transports-et-deplacements-entd-2008
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ment (8%), and 118 MtCO2e for gross fixed capital formation (investment,
16%), neglecting some residual aggregates.
In our computation of carbon footprint of households, emissions from
final demand of households have obviously been allocated to them, ss have
been direct emissions, except direct emission of CH4 and N2 O coming from
sanitation. This amounts to a total of 559 MtCO2e .
Emissions from final consumption of households are allocated according
to current consumption expenditure, segmented by consumption item; the
data comes from the Insee Household Budget survey (Budget des familles).
For example, the survey reports expenditure on fuel, food, clothing, and so on
in euros. The national emissions inventory data determines a carbon content
for each of these expenditures (tCO2e /e of expenditure), which makes it
possible to reconstitute the emissions from the consumption of each of the
households surveyed.
Allocating emissions from final consumption of government or from investment, which are not part of household final consumption demand, requires us to complement the standard consumption-based accounting with
other allocation conventions, specific to these emissions. For the emissions
from final consumption of government, we have adopted a civic principle,
which allocates these emissions in proportion to the number of persons per
household. Each resident therefore takes their share of the government emissions, on an equal footing with all others, simply by virtue of her participation to the national community.
Other conventions are possible. Wier et al. (2001); Roca and Serrano
(2007); Weber and Matthews (2008); Lenglart et al. (2010); Ummel (2014)
only impute emissions from final consumption of households and therefore
do not take these government emissions into account in the carbon footprint
of households. Lenzen (1998) considers taxes as an expenditure that purchases government services. Government emissions are therefore allocated
according to the amount of taxes paid, which increases the progressivity of
emissions as a function of expenditure (in comparison to the absence of imputation), while on the contrary our civic vision, which is also adopted by
Gill and Moeller (2018), decreases it. Gough et al. (2012) allocate these emissions according to the actual consumption of public services, which tends to
further decrease progressivity with expenditures.
To illustrate this civic distribution, we have calculated that 2 tCO2e accrues to a family of average size and composition by virtue of its presence
on French soil. Adding this component hardly changes the distribution in
average emissions across deciles because the size of the household is almost
the same per decile of standard of living and per location. Note that for the
same reason, presenting emissions per person instead of per household would
not change the carbon footprint picture presented in this article.
For investment emissions (i.e. emissions from gross fixed capital consumption), it is even less obvious to allocate them to households. With the
44
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exception of purchases of real estate, land, and major works in housing carried out by households, these investments are largely made by organisations,
companies and communities. Admittedly, because these investments enable
the production of public or private goods, these emissions could in principle
be allocated to future household consumption, but at the cost of additional
assumptions. For the calculations that follow, we therefore leave aside investment emissions, knowing that they represent less than 16% of the total. The
ECOPA project33 has calculated the carbon footprint of households with
allocation of emissions from investments made by households. This does
not change the general picture, but slightly increases the progressiveness of
emissions according to income.
B.1.2

Method for estimating footprint

To estimate the carbon footprint of households, a standard method (Weber
and Matthews, 2008) is to use input-output analysis to obtain average GHG
coefficients per euro of final consumption for each expenditure item, and
then combine these coefficients with data on household spending. One of
the drawbacks of this method is that the macro-aggregates may not necessarily be matched because of statistical inconsistencies between macro- and
micro-data (Lenglart et al., 2010, p. 102-103). Complex data treatment to
reconcile data sources and build overall consistency is needed to overcome
this problem, while work in this direction is rare, such as that of Lenglart
et al. (2010).
For this study, we chose a simpler method (Gough et al., 2012), which
takes the emissions aggregates established at the macro-level and allocates
them to household observations on a pro-rata basis for each item. This
means that the difference between the total of the micro-economic expenditure of a product category and its macro-economic estimate is absorbed in
the emissions content of that category (tCO2 /e).
More specifically, the attribution of the carbon footprint of all French
households to the observations of the Family Budget Survey (BDF) distinguishes between the attribution of direct emissions (energy consumption by
households) and the attribution of indirect emissions (resulting from the
production of the goods and services consumed).
The data from SDES on national direct GHG emissions were attributed
to BDF micro-observations using an estimate of household CO2 emissions
from the BDF survey, distinguishing between energy combustion for housing
services and fuel combustion for transportation. Indirect emissions from the
production of electricity and district heat, and also from the refining, conversion and distribution of fossil fuels are accounted for in the national indirect
emissions of the SDES data and imputed like other indirect emissions using
33
Supported by the French National Research Agency ANR (https://anr.fr/ProjetANR-12-SENV-0006)
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COICOP Code
4500
4511
4521
4522
4531
4541
4551

Description
Electricity + gas bill (not separable)
Electricity bill, main residence, other dwelling, garage,
outbuilding
Gas bill, main residence, other dwelling
Purchases of butane, propane, main residence, other
accommodation
Liquid fuels, the main residence: fuel oil, heating oil,
petroleum
Solid fuel, main residence
District heating (steam)

Table A – Distribution of household energy expenditure by COICOP category in BDF
the BDF expenditure, here the expenditures by energy source (electricity,
gas, butane-propane, fuel oil and other liquid fuels, district heat, wood and
other solid fuels for housing, fuels for private vehicles).
Direct emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels by households were
estimated by applying emission coefficients to the quantities of energy (kWh)
imputed to the micro-observation of BDF by de Lauretis (2017). These
quantities were deduced by dividing the expenditure data from the BDF
survey (see table A) for each energy source by the average energy prices
(e per MWh) estimated for different categories of households (see below).
Expenditures on "electricity plus gas (inseparable)" have been allocated
to the two energy sources as a proportion of the electricity and gas expenditures that are separable for households using the same home heating system.
De Lauretis (2017) estimates energy prices for 2010 for each energy source
(Table 2.9, p.46). For gas and electricity, prices are distinguished from the
PHEBUS survey (2013) according to 60 groups of households defined by
crossing the quintile of standard of living to which the household belongs, 6
modalities of household type (according to size, composition and age) and
two modalities of housing type (individual house or collective housing).
The energy prices obtained for 2013 have been retropolated for 2010 using
the "Pégase" base of energy prices. An average car fuel price is also estimated
for each of the 60 household groups. Indeed, BDF’s fuel expenditure includes
all types of fuel, which can have very different selling prices. For each group
of households, the breakdown of consumption between petrol and diesel (the
two fuels that account for the vast majority of household consumption) is
calculated from the ENTD transport survey (2008). The average price of
the two fuels in 2010 is based on the consumer prices in e/l provided by the
2010 transport accounts (SDES), which are then transformed into e/MWh
46
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on the basis of the lower calorific value of the fuels. Finally, a weighted
average makes it possible to estimate the average car fuel price for each
group of households.
The Pégase database also provides average prices for fuel oil, LPG and
wood, which are assumed to be the same for all households due to a lack of
information on the heterogeneity of tariffs. The price of district heat, which
is also unique, is given by the AMORCE/ADEME survey (2012).
The CO2 emissions for housing services of households used to allocate the
corresponding national direct emissions from the SDES data are calculated
by summing the emissions of gas, butane-propane, fuel oil and other liquid
fuels, wood and other solid fuels for each of the micro-observations of BDF.
Direct emissions of CH4 and N2 O from households (non-centralised) sanitation are marginal (1.5% of the direct households’ emissions, 3.5 ‰ of total
emissions attributed by our study) and have not been assigned.
The volumes of national indirect emissions of CO2 , CH4 and N2 O, resulting from the households’ consumptions of products and services were
attributed to the BDF survey observations using the expenditure data for
the 37 aggregates of products and services corresponding to level 2 of the
COICOP 1998 nomenclature of consumption functions34 .
The Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE)
made available the coefficients for bridging these expenditure nomenclatures.
Preliminary work is indeed necessary to establish a bridge with the 88
products of the input-output nomenclature (activities-products), at level 2
of the international CPA nomenclature35 .
The emission data by household observation and by product item were
then aggregated to produce the graphs.
Our own emission categories group the emissions of the following COICOP
categories:
• housing energy: c045
• car fuels: c072
• transport services: c073, c074
• food: c011, c012, c013, c021, c022, c023, c024
• major works in housing: c043, c044
• tangible goods: c031, c032, c033, c051, c052, c053, c054, c055, c056,
c057, c06, c071, c08121, c08131, c08141, c091, c092, c093, c094, c095
• tangible services: c111, c112, c121, c123
34

https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/2408172
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=
Glossary:Statistical_classification_of_products_by_activity_(CPA)/en
35
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• intangible services: c041, rev801, c046, c08111, c096, c097, c101, c124,
c125, c126, c127
B.1.3

Variability of reconstructed carbon footprints

We used the carbon footprints thus reconstructed for each of the households
surveyed to estimate not only the average carbon footprint, which is standard, but also the variability of the carbon footprint, which is less frequent.
Estimating carbon footprint variability from BDF expenditure data poses
a number of difficulties. The first are related to the emissions reconstruction
method, which assumes constant emission content per euro spent by expenditure category. On the one hand, this method neglects the quality effect
(see main text), which leads, if this effect is significant, to overestimating the
proportionality relation of emissions to expenditure, and thus overestimating
variability. On the other hand, the use of constant emission content coefficients neglects the variability linked to different techniques, which leads to an
underestimation of the variability. For the most emitting items (transport
and energy expenditures for housing services), precision can be gained by
matching BDF data with specific databases providing information on these
technical characteristics.
The last difficulty is related to the methodology of the BDF survey. This
methodology extrapolates annual expenditure from the information gathered in diaries that record the household’s purchases during one week and
interviews on certain expenditure items. The interaction between the survey
methodology and the occasional purchase of goods produces discrepancies
between the expenditure reconstructed by the survey and the actual expenditure of a household during the year. For example, car fuel expenditure is
estimated from purchase records. A household that fills up their car during
the survey week will therefore have much higher reconstituted expenditures
than a household that does not purchase gasoline during this particular week.
In another example, gas expenditures are sometimes reconstructed from the
last bill. For a household heating with gas, more significant expenditures
(and thus emissions) will be attributed depending on whether the household
is surveyed in winter or summer.
Because of these effects, for a given household, the survey is not representative of its total annual expenditures. Once a sufficiently large set of
households is considered, the average estimates are nevertheless correct, as
these biases at the individual observation level cancel each other out. Thus,
for example, the total annual expenditures of all households, the average annual expenditures, the average annual expenditures within a decile, and so on
are correctly estimated. Meanwhile, apart from the mean, the distributions
of expenditures revealed by the survey are not representative of the distributions of real expenditures; that is the statistical moments greater than 2
(and in particular the variance) of these two distributions will not coincide.
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For emissions, this means that if average emissions are correctly estimated,
the variability of emissions is certainly biased. It is generally considered that
the methodology followed leads to over-estimating the variability of emissions
(Büchs and Schnepf, 2013, p. 116-117).
Finally, it should be noted that the precision of the estimates for the
measures of variability given in this paper (the emission quartiles within a
decile) is less than the precision of the average emissions of this decile because
the sample size is smaller. The measures of variability given in the paper
should therefore be understood more as plausible orders of magnitude than
as true statistical estimates.

B.2

Emission inequalities from energy services

The PHEBUS survey collects from about 3,000 households the characteristics
of the dwelling, the equipment, the inhabitants and the energy bills. In the
second part, the survey provides data relating to the diagnosis of energy
performance (DPE) of the dwelling, carried out by an approved organisation.
The data relating to monetary energy expenditure collected in the PHEBUS survey are translated into physical consumption on the basis of subscribed tariffs, as well as energy prices data from the Pégase database36 .
Certain data relating to physical electricity consumption from the PHEBUS
survey were then imputed by the SDES (Denjean, 2014), in case of partial
or total non-response. Some aberrant data were also corrected afterwards
when there was no consistency between the equipment, uses and energy consumption variables.
For households with collective heating or domestic hot water (e.g. collective boiler, heating network, etc.) it was not possible to access individual
physical energy consumptions. These consumptions were reconstituted on
the basis of the specific housing charges for heating and hot water paid by
the households, when this information was available, and it was estimated
for the others, from the data of the (CEREN, 2013b) and on the basis of the
surface area and the year of construction of the dwelling in particular.
Once these total physical consumptions in kWh for each household and
for the different energy vectors (e.g. electricity, gas, etc.) have been reconstituted, they have to be attributed to the different energy uses: heating,
domestic hot water, cooking and specific electricity. In some cases, an energy vector is used for a single use (e.g. wood for heating), while in other
cases it serves several uses (e.g. gas for heating and cooking). A rule for the
breakdown of energy consumption over the different energy uses was therefore necessary. This is carried out on the basis of regressions from studies
by the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherche Economique sur l’Energie (CEREN,
2007, 2013a), which are based on the equipment owned by the household as
36
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well as the surface area of the dwelling and the characteristics of the inhabitants. This work of decomposition thus makes it possible to reconstitute
the energy consumption by energy vector for heating, domestic hot water,
cooking and specific electricity.
Finally, an emission factor is applied to each energy vector to reconstitute
the CO2 emissions of each household, by energy vector and by use. The data
are taken from the ADEME carbon database (ADEME, French Environment
and Energy Management Agency) which in particular consider a breakdown
by use for electricity consumptions to take into account the seasonal variability of use and the carbon content of the associated electricity mix. It is
then possible, from all these data, to determine the CO2 emissions for each
of the households responding to the survey, by energy vector and by energy
use.
A comparison of each household’s heating consumption data with a theoretical consumption threshold is then carried out. These theoretical heating
consumption values are calculated according to the standard of the Energy
Performance Diagnostic (DPE), calculation carried out for each of the households surveyed. The calculation method used is the 3CL-DPE method37 .

B.3

Emissions inequalities from transport

The Enquête nationale transport et déplacements (ENTD) survey asks about
20,000 households about their socio-demographic characteristics and the vehicles they own. It also collects, from an individual over 6 years of age,
randomly selected in each household, his or her mobility practices on a typical working day and during the weekend for the past week, as well as his or
her long-distance trips over the last 13 weeks: distance, mode of transport,
reason, duration, and so on.
The local mobility data by mode and by purpose are taken from the
"local travels" section of the ENTD survey, which asks a randomly selected
household member aged 6 years and over about his or her mobility practices
on a typical working day and during a weekend for the past week.
The long-distance mobility data by mode and by reason are taken from
the "long-distance journeys" section of the ENTD survey, which interviews
one person randomly selected in each household on his or her trips made
in the last 13 weeks. To obtain annualised data on kilometres travelled, we
extrapolate this partial observation of households’ trips.
To infer energy consumptions in kWh from kilometres travelled, the unitary consumption per kilometre of the different modes of transport other
than the private car is taken from the SDES transport accounts data38 . To
37

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=
JORFTEXT000026601023&categorieLien=id
38
https://www.statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/les-comptes-destransports-en-2008
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determine the unitary consumption per kilometre for private vehicles, a regression model is used from the individual data from the "Ownership of
private vehicles" section of the ENTD survey: age of first entry into service
of the vehicle, type of fuel used, fiscal power of the vehicle and total unladen
weight (Cayla, 2011).
Finally, emission factors for the different energy vectors, taken from the
ADEME carbon base, are applied to the different energy consumptions previously calculated in order to reconstitute CO2 emissions. It is then possible,
using all these data, to determine the CO2 emissions by energy vector and
by energy use for different household groups by aggregating the individual
weighted consumptions. Indeed, in the case of the national transport and
travel survey database, only a limited part of mobility practices was surveyed and for only one individual within each household. It is therefore very
difficult to trace total annual energy consumption and CO2 emissions for the
households of the database.

B.4

Definition of modalities of urban settlement patterns

The variable of urban settlement pattern is based on the categorisation used
in the IMMOVE model, which was developed by EDF. Two geographical
factors were used: the size of the urban area to which the commune belongs,
and its distance from the center of the said urban area (see also Raillard
(2017) for a description of the zoning).
More precisely, the first dimension is based on the size of the municipality that constitutes the center of the urban area to which the municipality
belongs:
• Municipality outside the urban area or size strictly less than 2,000
inhabitants (1st line of table B);
• Size between 2,000 and 100,000 inhabitants (2nd row);
• Size strictly greater than 100,000 inhabitants, excluding the Paris conurbation (3rd row);
• Parisian agglomeration (4th row).
The second dimension describes the position of the commune in the urban
area:
• If the commune is outside urban areas or multipolarised, it is a so-called
rural commune (1st column in the table B);
• When the commune belongs to an urban area:
– If it belongs to the peripheral ring, it is said to be polarised (2nd
column);
51
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Size of center of
urban area

Rural
municipality

Polarised
municipality

Municipality
of the urban
center

City center of
the urban
center

< 2 000 inhab.
2 000–100 000
inhab.
> 100 000 hab.
Parisian agglo.

Rural

Rural

–

–

Rural

Rural

Suburbs

Suburbs

–
–

Suburbs
Suburbs

Suburbs
Centre

Centre
Centre

Table B – Modalities of urban settlement patterns defined by two dimensions
– If not, it belongs to the urban center and a distinction is made
between belonging to the urban center (column 3) and the city
center of the urban center (column 4).
The table B presents the zoning retained from these two dimensions. The
relevance of the zoning thus described is validated by various studies (Bigot
et al., 2009; Tregouët, 2010).
The distance to the center variable is available in the PHEBUS survey,
but not in the Family Budget survey. For reasons of individual data protection, we asked the INSEE statistical service to provide us with the urban
settlement patterns modality for the BDF observations, based on a correspondence table that we provided them with between the commune code
(2006 classification) and the adopted classification.

B.5

Emissions from air travel

Given that air transport emissions are regularly decried in the media, we feel
that it is important to discuss a few methodological points in relation to the
figures used in our analysis of the ENTD survey (2008).
Emissions for air travel, which amount at most, for D10 households, to
1.7 tCO2e per household and per year, may seem low compared to the orders
of magnitude that can be found in the press, for example 2.5 tCO2e tonnes
per passenger (Monod, 2019).
There are two reasons for this low average figure:
• First, the emissions accounted for in our study are only the CO2 emissions linked to the combustion of aircraft fuel, in line with the choices
made for other modes of transport. Therefore, the volume of emissions
do not include grey emissions (aircraft construction) or emissions from
associated services (e.g. on-board power, or airport). Above all, they
do not include emissions related to condensation trails and the formation of altitude clouds, which would double the GHG count of the
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aviation sector. With this emission perimeter, and using our method,
a round trip from Paris to New York and back for one passenger emits:
5,775 km x 115 kg CO2 / pkm x 2 (A/R) = 1.32 tCO2e .
• Second, and more importantly, air travels are less frequent than might
be expected. For all ages, the average number of trips in 2008, the
survey year, was 0.37 per person. Being between the ages of 20 and 40,
having a higher income, or coming from a large urban area increase the
chances of having travelled by air, relative to the rest of the population
(Bouffard-Savary, 2010). The perception of more frequent air travel
than one every three years may come from a subjective estimate made
on a population with these characteristics, this bias is exacerbated by
the trend increase in air traffic between 2008 and 2019.
With an average household size of 2.2 people in France and an average
trip estimated at 2,255 km like Istanbul in Turkey, one of the favourite
destinations for the French, a round trip generates about 0.72 tCO2e per
passenger, which leads to 2.2 * 0.37 * 0.72 = 0.59 tCO2e per year and per
household, a figure of the same order of magnitude as our average estimate
of 0.48 tCO2e for annual air transport emissions for one average household.
We can compare our estimates with others and see that the orders of magnitude are the right ones. To estimate the emissions of an air trip, we make
assumptions about aircraft occupancy rates and specific unit consumption
for short, medium and long haul flights from (Enerdata, 2004). This leads
us to an average of 130gCO2 /km for all the trips in the survey. Based on
the same survey, Longuar et al. (2010, p.168) estimate unitary emissions at
128gCO2 /km, this figure is consistent with ours. If the passenger-kilometres
of the French are correctly evaluated by ENTD 2008, then our emission estimates should be of the right order of magnitude, taking into account the
perimeter chosen.
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